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Abstract
Cooperation is one of the most studied paradigms for the understanding of social interac-
tions. Reciprocal altruism -a special type of cooperation that is taught by means of the iter-
ated prisoner dilemma game (iPD)- has been shown to emerge in different species with
different success rates. When playing iPD against a reciprocal opponent, the larger theoreti-
cal long-term reward is delivered when both players cooperate mutually. In this work, we
trained rats in iPD against an opponent playing a Tit for Tat strategy, using a payoff matrix
with positive and negative reinforcements, that is food and timeout respectively. We showed
for the first time, that experimental rats were able to learn reciprocal altruism with a high
average cooperation rate, where the most probable state was mutual cooperation (85%).
Although when subjects defected, the most probable behavior was to go back to mutual
cooperation. When we modified the matrix by increasing temptation rewards (T) or by
increasing cooperation rewards (R), the cooperation rate decreased. In conclusion, we
observe that an iPD matrix with large positive reward improves less cooperation than one
with small rewards, shown that satisfying the relationship among iPD reinforcement was not
enough to achieve high mutual cooperation behavior. Therefore, using positive and negative
reinforcements and an appropriate contrast between rewards, rats have cognitive capacity
to learn reciprocal altruism. This finding allows to infer that the learning of reciprocal altruism
has early appeared in evolution.
Introduction
Altruism is a behavior by an individual that may be to his disadvantage but benefits others
individuals. At first sight, Darwin’s natural selection theory does not explain altruistic behav-
ior. Theories have been proposed to account altruist behavior: kin selection [1], group selec-
tion and reciprocal altruism [2] among others. In the reciprocal altruism theory, the loss
experienced by an individual for being altruist returns later on behalf of the reciprocal partner.
Thus, in the long term, being altruist becomes the most useful strategy. In this regard, Triver’s
theory of reciprocal altruism explains how natural selection favors reciprocal altruism between
non-related individuals. Perhaps the most insightful example of such behavior is the one
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observed among vampire bats, where individuals share blood with others who have previously
shared their food [3].
Since 1971, Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (iPD) has been a useful tool to study reciprocal
altruism [4]. In the iPD, two players must choose between two possible behaviors: to cooperate
or to defect. Rewards and punishments are defined in a 2x2 payoff matrix. When the game is
played indefinitely, which is its iterated version, mutual cooperative behavior is favored. When
played once, to defect is the best strategy [5]. However, when the game runs indefinitely, evolu-
tionary stable strategies (ESS) emerge [6, 7] and, under certain constraints imposed to the pay-
off matrix, mutual cooperation appears as the best strategy whenever reciprocity is maintained
(Pareto Optimum). Among a huge number of reciprocal strategies, tit for tat is one of the most
simple ones [8]. It is based on two simple rules: to cooperate in the first trial and, in the follow-
ing, to do what the other player (opponent) did in the last trial.
Among many reciprocal behaviors, reciprocity and reciprocal altruism were well docu-
mented in several species. Although cooperation is needed to succeed in both reciprocity and
reciprocal altruism, the latter adds the possibility of obtaining reward by defecting an oppo-
nent. Some experiments show reciprocal altruism behavior by means of iPD paradigm in
different ways, but the results were either low levels of cooperation [9] or depended on a treat-
ment that enhanced cooperation preference (mutualism matrix) [10–12]. Direct reciprocity,
which is established between two individuals, has been observed in monkeys [13–15] and in
rats [16–19]. While food quality seemed to impact on cooperative behavior, a key factor to
obtain reliable cooperation levels was the opponent’s behavior. In this sense, individuals
tended to be more cooperative with opponents that had cooperated in the past. However,
when reciprocal altruism is studied, differences between species come to light. Thus, while
reciprocal altruism has been proven in monkeys, birds and rats failed to reach high levels of
cooperation, even for complex combinations of rewards and punishments in the payoff matrix
and treatments to induce preference [9, 10, 12, 20–23]. The reasons why some species do not
learn reciprocal altruism remain obscure. A possible explanation is that animals are not able to
discriminate low contrast reward contingencies. Indeed, it has been shown that rats fail to dis-
criminate the amount of reward when the number of reward units is larger than three [24–26].
In this work, we designed an iPD setup to maximize the contrast among reinforcers. The
amounts of pellets were chosen in order to minimize positive reinforcement earned in each
trial and to keep rats motivated (hungry), [27]. In order to evaluate if animals developed ALLC
strategy by place preference (after animals learned iPD) they were trained on reversal. We also




We used thirty male Long-Evans rats (weight 300-330g and two months old) provided by the
IBYME-CONICET, divided in two experiments. In the first one, eighteen rats (twelve experi-
mental and six opponent), and in the second, twelve rats (six experimental and six opponent).
Experimental subjects were housed in pairs (to allow social interaction), and opponent rats
were housed individually. All rats were food restricted and maintained at 90-95% for experi-
mental subjects, and 80-85% for opponents of free feeding body weight, all with tap water
available ad libitum. The housing room was at 22˚C ± 2˚C and 12/12 h light/dark cycle (with
lights on at 9 am). Pre-training was performed on a single standard operant chamber (MED
associates Inc., USA) equipped with two stimulus light and retractable levers below the light
and feeders. Also the chambers were inside an anechoic chamber with white noise (with a flat
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power spectral density). The iPD experiments were performed in ad hoc dual chamber
equipped with levers, lights and feeders (Fig 1A). The chambers were connected by windows
allowing rats to make olfactory and eye contact. The lever’s height was 80% of maximum
height of the forepaws while rearing [27]. The dual chamber is shown in supplementary mate-
rial (see S2 Fig). At the end of daylight, supplementary food was provided to allow rats to
maintain body weight.
Pre-experimental training
All rats had a shaping procedure to learn the response (press a lever) to get a reinforcement
(pellets). To prevent animals from choosing a lever place over the other, they learned to get
reward from both sides by changing the side of conditioned stimulus. The side was changed
after eight trials. All rats learned to press the correct lighting lever after four sessions. Each rat
was trained in 2 sessions per day, each trial began with the inter-trial interval (ITI) during 5
seconds, it was followed by the conditioning stimulus (light) for either 45 seconds or until a
lever was pressed. One second before food is delivered, the feeder was lighted. In the oppo-
nent’s training, they learned to press the lever when the light was on. In the task, the side of the
active lever was chosen pseudo-randomly (allowing the same side no more than four times).
The opponent subject had to perform a fix ratio treatment up to FR = 5 to get rewards.
Experiment
To study the reciprocal altruism in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game (iPD), we used a pay-
off matrix with positive and negative reinforcements. Positive reinforcements were pellets
(Bio-Serv 45 mg Dustless Precision Pellets) and negative reinforcement was timeout (a fix
delay in starting a new trial). The payoff of the experimental subject was according to the
matrix, and the opponent’s payoff was 1 pellet when the correct lighted lever was pressed. For
the opponent, when the incorrect lever was pressed, there was no contingency and no pellet
was delivered. The trial finishes after 45 seconds elapsed, or when the correct lever is pressed.
The iPD game has four possible occupancy states where experimental and opponent individual
behaviors can be as follows: both cooperate (mutual cooperation, R), both do not cooperate
(mutual defection, P), experimental subject does not cooperate when the opponent cooperates
(T), and experimental cooperates when the opponent does not cooperate (S). The amount
of pellets preference was previously tested on a discrimination test, showing that rats prefer 2
pellets rather than 1 pellet (data not showed). We performed two sessions per day and each
session had 30 trials. Each experimental subject was trained with the same opponent. The
training was finished after five consecutive sessions with no changes in the cooperation rate.
We defined cooperation (C) and defection (D) lever in the iPD box. The single iPD trial proce-
dure was as follows: (1) ITI time, (2) then, the light (CS) was turned on, (3) after this, both rats
made their responses, the light was turned off and the reinforcement was delivered according
to a payoff matrix, (4) if positive reinforcement was assigned, the feeder’s light was turned on,
and a second later a reward was delivered. The opponent’s Conditioned Stimulus (light) was
controlled following a Tit for tat strategy. The opponent received a pellet after pressing three
times the lever (FR = 3, so as to be enough time in front of the window until the experimental
subject choose a lever). If negative reinforcement (timeout) was assigned, delay time started,
and the opponent subject got a pellet reward. (5) After either five seconds eating time expired
or timeout was completed, a new trial started. In the first experiment the payoff matrix was: 1
pellet for mutual cooperation (PR = 1), 2 pellets when the experimental subject defected and
the opponent cooperated (PT = 2), 4 seconds of timeout for mutual defection (PP = 4seconds),
and 8 seconds of timeout when the experimental subject cooperated and the opponent
Reciprocal altruism in rats: The role of payoff matrix
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Fig 1. High level of cooperation in iPD. (A) Dual operant box diagram and the matrix with positive(blue) and negative(red) reinforcement
is shown. The iPD game had four possible states: R(reward) mutual cooperation, P(punishment) mutual defection, T(temptation) in which
subject defected and opponent cooperated and S(sucker) subject cooperated and opponent defected. The opponent´s light was driven in
order to perform a Tit for tat strategy. (B,C) Time-course of cooperation and timeout rate along the last 23 games sessions. In the last 5
sessions, the mean ± sem of cooperation was 0.86 ± 0.05 and timeout was 0.23 ± 0.08. (D) Total reward versus timeout for all animals (color
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defected (PS = 8). At the end of these experiments, the four rats with the best performance in
cooperation were trained in a reversion treatment (see Fig 1F). When rats were trained on
reversal, the sides of C and D lever were interchanged in subject and opponent chambers. In
that sense, if animals developed a place-preference behavior, they will not learn the new side in
order to maximize reward. In the second experiment we used six naive experimental rats on a
different payoff matrix with greater temptation (PR = 1, PT = 3, PP = 4, PS = 8). After training,
we divided rats in two groups, depending on cooperation levels. The first group (Treat 2A)
with high cooperation rate was trained with the payoff matrix (PR = 1, PT = 5, PP = 4, PS = 8)
with greater temptation for T state (Treat 3A). The other group (with low cooperation rate,
Treat 2B) was trained with the matrix (PR = 2, PT = 3, PP = 4, PS = 8, Treat 3B) that enhances
cooperative behavior (in comparison with (PR = 1, PT = 3, PP = 4, PS = 8), but with low contrast
between positive rewards (see Table 1). All experimental procedures were approved by the eth-
ics committee of the IByME-CONICET and were conducted according to the NIH Guide for
Care and Use of Laboratory Animals.2.1 Subjects and Housing.
Statistic. All statistical analyses were performed using statistics library from open source
software Octave and MATLAB. We pooled the data from the last five sessions where coopera-
tion rate was stable (to calculate cooperation rate we counted the number of times a rat chose
the cooperation lever per session). We compared individual’s means of cooperation along
treatment using a two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test. To test whether the probability of coop-
eration after each outcome (T, R, P or S) was different from chance (0.5), we performed a Chi-
square goodness of fit test with Bonferroni corrected value of 0.05/n. To compare mean rate of
the different outcomes for each game, we performed an ANOVA two tails test. When signifi-
cant α = 0.05, multiple post-hoc pairwise comparative tests were performed with Bonferroni
corrected value of α = 0.0125. The individual’s decision rules can be described by the compo-
nents of transition vectors and Markov Chain diagram. The transition vector was made up of
probabilities of cooperation when the previous trials resulted in state p(c|R−1), T(temptation)
p(c|T−1), S(sucker) p(c|S−1) or P(punishment), p(c|P−1) respectively. If every component of
bar means cooperation mean). Each animal was compared with the regression line fit to a population with cooperation level set to 60%
(black continuous line). The higher the cooperation levels, the larger the total reward and the lower the total timeout. (E) Markov Chain
diagram shows the probabilities of transition between states (p(c|T−1) = 0.76, p(c|R−1) = 0.85, p(c|S−1) = 0.93, p(c|P−1) = 0.87). The arrow
represents transitions: driven by cooperation in blue, and driven by defection in red (the arrow thickness is proportional to transition
probability). Below, bars show occupancy ratio when cooperation reaches stability. Probabilities were: p(R) = 0.76, p(T) = 0.1, p(P) = 0.04,
p(S) = 0.1. Asterisks denote significant differences from multiple comparisons using one-way ANOVA and Bonferroni correction. (F)
Evolution cooperation rate before and after reversal. Graphs show a moving average with samples of 3 sessions (the mean and sem from
reversal on the last five sessions was 0.87 ± 0.04).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204837.g001
Table 1. Data summary. Treatment 1: testing of high cooperation and reversion. Treatment 2 and 3: effect in cooperation by change of pay-off matrix. The matrix changed
over the group with same word (A or B).
Treat Groups Cooperation Probability State Transition Probabilities
p(T) p(R) p(S) p(p) p(c|T1) p(c|R1) p(c|S1) p(c|P1)
1 coop 0.86 ± 0.05 0.10 0.76 0.1 0.04 0.76 0.85 0.93 0.87
no coop 0.36 ± 0.03 0.44 0.38 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.19 0.33 0.23
reversal 0.87 ± 0.04 0.11 0.77 0.02 0.10 0.86 0.89 1.00 0.82
2 A 0.87 ± 0.04 0.09 0.80 0.03 0.08 0.65 0.90 0.87 0.94
B 0.64 ± 0.13 0.23 0.34 0.21 0.22 0.47 0.55 0.56 0.65
3 A 0.61 ± 0.10 0.18 0.44 0.21 0.17 0.45 0.64 0.62 0.78
B 0.71 ± 0.04 0.20 0.51 0.09 0.20 0.62 0.66 0.67 0.66
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204837.t001
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this vector is 0.5, the agent’s decision rule is random mode. Markov Chain diagram show the
graphic representation of the complete decision making rule for each rat.
Results
We trained twelve rats in iPD against an opponent that plays Tit for tat strategy. Tit for tat is
based on two simple rules: to cooperate in the first trial and, in the following, to do what the
other player (opponent) did in the last trial. Fig 1A shows a schema of the different choices a
subject can do in each trial. Thus, when the subject cooperates, it receives one pellet (PR) or
eight seconds timeout (PS) depending on whether the opponent choice was to cooperate or to
defect. On the other hand, when the subject defects, it receives 2 pellets (PT) or four seconds
timeout (PP), according to whether the opponent choice was to cooperate or to defect respec-
tively. The criteria for cooperation was an established preference for pressing C lever (coopera-
tion) over D lever (defection) in more than 60% of the trials for five or more consecutive
sessions. Eight out of twelve animals learned to cooperate (cooperation rate 0.86 ± 0.05,
mean ± s.e.m), reaching criteria in 30 ± 4 sessions (mean ± s.e.m). In Fig 1B, we show the
mean cooperation levels for those animals during the last twenty three sessions before reaching
criteria. The inset in Fig 1B shows the mean cooperation level for each animal during the last
five training sessions. As a consequence of the increase in cooperation levels, the average total
timeout per session decreased as training progressed (0.23 ± 0.08, mean ± sem, see Fig 1C).
Due to the fact that different sequences of lever pressing can give the same amount of
reward and/or timeout independently of the cooperation level, we analyzed the relationship
between total reward and timeout for each animal in comparison to a simulated population. A
regression line was fit to a population of 100,000 simulated individuals with cooperation level
set to 60%, (see Fig 1D). Each simulated individual had one different strategy and each one
was a combination of thirty C and D choices (session length). An individual that plays an iPD
game with 60% of its choices in C will be near to the line, regardless of its strategies. As it can
be seen in the figure, for the cooperator group when the cooperation level increases, the larger
are the total reward, and the lower the total timeout. For the non cooperator group placed in
the opposite side of the figure, it can be seen that both cooperation and reward were low and
timeout was high. The regression line at 60% of cooperation separates both groups (marked
with a red circle in the Fig 1D). This shows that no behavior with low level of cooperation (sub-
group in blue range) can obtain both high level of reward and small amount of timeout as in
the cooperative group. The average strategies of both group can be represented by Markov
model diagram. We built one Markov model for the group of cooperative animals (see Fig 1E)
averaging occupancy state rate and transition probabilities in the group. In the iPD there are
four possible occupancy states where experimental and opponent individual behaviors can be
as follows: R (both cooperate or mutual cooperation), P (both do not cooperate or mutual
defection), T (experimental subject does not cooperate when the opponent cooperates), and S
(experimental cooperates when the opponent does not cooperate). The cooperative group
showed that the permanency in R state was high and, whenever the animal defects (states T
and P), it returns to cooperate immediately. Indeed all conditional probabilities to cooperate
given a previous outcome were near 1. Besides, the rate of R state was the highest and other
states near zero. The probability of R state was significantly different to other states (p =<
1e−8, ANOVA two-way test, n = 8). On the contrary, in the group of non-cooperative animals,
any states were significantly different to the other p> 0.05, F = 0.353, ANOVA two-way test,
n = 4) and the probability to cooperate given a previous states did not evidence preference for
any defined strategy (see Table 1 conditional probability to cooperate). For the group of non-
cooperative animals Markov model (see S1 Fig, supplementary materials).
Reciprocal altruism in rats: The role of payoff matrix
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To discard the fact that animals had a preference for one of the levers and, in consequence,
their behavior biased independently of the training paradigm, we selected the best four cooper-
ators and applied a reversal procedure immediately after cooperation was reached. All animals
learned to cooperate after reversal (cooperation rate, 0.87 ± 0.04, mean ± sem), (see Fig 1F).
We then asked how the ratio in the amount of positive reinforcement of R and T states
affects cooperation learning and maintenance. We defined a contrast index CI that measures




Thus, in the experiment shown in Fig 1, the CI was 1
3
which is the maximum contrast level
constrained to a payoff matrix that favors cooperation, that is, 2PR> PT + PS, assuming that
S becomes a negative stimulus induced by timeout. We trained six animals with a payoff
matrix (PR = 1, PT = 3, PP = 4, PS = 8) and found that three animals learned to cooperate
(0.88 ± 0.01, mean ± sem, see Fig 2A), while others did not (0.64 ± 0.13, mean ± sem, see Fig
2B. The last group was non cooperator, since both their conditional probabilities to cooper-
ate and occupancy R state ratios were near chance. For details see Table 1. Then we changed
the amount of reward in order to increase/decrease CI in the cooperative/non-cooperative
groups. As it can be seen, a high value of CI ¼ 2
3
, related to a pay-off matrix (PR = 1, PT = 5,
PP = 4, PS = 8), disrupts cooperation in cooperative group, Fig 2A. The cooperation was
0.604 ± 0.102, mean ± sem whereas before 0.88 ± 0.01). When a lower value of CI ¼ 1
5
was
applied for non cooperator group and the matrix (PR = 2, PT = 3, PP = 4, PS = 8) empowers
the cooperation in two out of three animals, cooperation rate 0.711 ± 0.04, mean ± sem,
whereas before 0.64 ± 0.13 (see Table 1).
We analyzed how these changes in strategies impact on the amount of received reward and
timeout penalties. In the group of cooperative animals, the change in T (3 pellets to 5 pellets)
increased both timeout and only a bit reward, as expected when states T, P and S become more
probable. The occupancy states ratio before and after matrix change had significant differences
among all states, p< 0.05 (wilcoxon ranksum test), (see Fig 2C and 2E). It is worth noting
however that the amount of received reward is not the maximum allowed, which would be
delivered in the case of an animal that alternates from state T to S indefinitely. On the other
hand, when we applied a matrix with a lower contrast CI ¼ 1
5
to the group of non-cooperative
animals, they enhance significantly their cooperation level, receiving more reward without sig-
nificant changes in total timeout, (see Fig 2D). In Fig 2F, we show the state occupancy proba-
bilities for this group before and after the change in the payoff matrix. It can be seen that the
occupancy state ratio of R had significantly increased after the change in the payoff matrix. It
can be observed a significant difference in R and P states, (pR< 0.008 and pP< 0.048, wilcoxon
rank-sum test). We showed that when the contrast index increased using a matrix to favor
cooperation the animals learned to cooperate, but when the index increased and the matrix
favor defection the animals stopped cooperating.
From the results shown in Figs 1 and 2, it is reasonable to ask whether a fine tuning in con-
trasted reward encourages cooperative behavior. We have shown that eight out of twelve ani-
malas (66%) acquired a cooperative behavior when CI was 1
3
, while three out of six (50%)
succeeded when CI was 1
2
, as expected when temptation payoff increases. In the same line of
reasoning, animals that learned cooperation under CI ¼ 1
2
disrupted their cooperative behavior
when CI was increased to 2
3
, while those that had not learned acquired a cooperative behavior
when CI was decreased to 1
5
. Fig 3A exemplifies the occupancy and transition probabilities for
an animal that disrupted its cooperative behavior when CI ¼ 1
2
was changed to CI ¼ 2
3
. The
Reciprocal altruism in rats: The role of payoff matrix
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Fig 2. Effect of changes in the amount of positive reinforcement of R and T. (A) The rats were pre-trained by pay-off matrix [PR = 1,
PT = 3, PP = 4, PS = 8 and contrast CI ¼ 12] (filled dots) and the cooperation was strongly affected by change of temptation payoff,
decreasing when T payoff increased and matrix with changed to [R = 1, T = 5, P = 4, S = 8 and contrast CI ¼ 2
3
] (open circles). There
was a significant difference (red circle) in two animals with p< 9.8e−06 (wilcoxon rank-sum test) and the other did not modify her
behavior in spite of matrix change. (B) The cooperation enhanced when the matrix changed to [R = 2, T = 3, P = 4, S = 8 and CI ¼ 1
5
]
Reciprocal altruism in rats: The role of payoff matrix
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opposite can be seen in the example of Fig 3B. A non-cooperative animal under a CI ¼ 1
2
became cooperative when CI was decreased to 1
5
. Fig 3C and 3D show cooperation levels and
normalized rewards. A normalized reward was calculated as quotient between the total reward
obtained in a session, and the maximum reward achieved using the best strategy. If the oppo-
nent subject plays a Tit for tat strategy, the best strategy will depend on the pay-off matrix val-
ues. In this way, if the matrix favors cooperation, ALLC will be the best one. In contrast, when
the payoff matrix favors no cooperation, alternate between C and D will be the best strategy. It
can be seen that both variables follow an inverted U profile as a function of contrast index CI,
as expected when a delicate balance between rewards at R and T is mandatory.
Discussion and conclusion
In this work, we study the contrasted role between reinforcements in the learning of reciprocal
altruism learning in rats. Traditionally, reciprocal altruism is achieved by playing the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma game (iPD) when an experimental subject is confronted to a reciprocal
opponent. The payoff matrix used has positive and negative reinforcements with high con-
trasted between positive and negative pairs and also uses discriminating amount of reinforce-
ments [25, 26]. In our experiment, pellets were used as positive reinforcements, and timeout
as negative reinforcement. In this way, the positive and negative reinforcements acted as
strengtheners of mutual cooperation behavior likelihood [28]. Our results show for the first
time high levels of cooperation (86,11%) and mutual cooperation (76,32%) in iPD, (see Fig
1B). Previous published works have taught reciprocity using iPD game, showing that animals
prefer short-term benefits or only improve a poor level of cooperation [4, 9, 20, 29, 30]. In
other works, authors employed a special treatment to enhance cooperation preference [10, 23,
31, 32]. A possible explanation is that using standard matrices (for example: PT = 6, PR = 4,
PP = 1, PS = 0), animals were not able to discriminate between the amount of reinforcement
obtained in the long-term in comparison to short-term [24]. For example, if a rat played four
sessions [C C C C] he would get 16 pellets, and if played [C D D D] he would get 12 pellets. In
our experiment, rats using the same choices earn 4 pellets and no timeout in the first case, and
3 pellets plus a 16 seconds timeout in the second case.
A dynamic system can be represented with Markov diagrams and its associated state transi-
tion vector. In this case, each state (T, R, P, S, see Results section) will have two associated con-
ditional probabilities: to cooperate or not to cooperate given state. In an IPD game with an
opponent using a Tit for tat strategy, a rational player should maximize the positive reinforce-
ment and cancel the negative reinforcement. In this way, while the opponent performed a
reciprocal behavior, the player follows an ALLC strategy with conditional cooperation proba-
bility near 1, independent of previous states (T, R, P o S). In a pay-off matrix with addable
value (as for an example (PT = 6, PR = 4, PP = 1, PS = 0), it is possible to calculate the coopera-
tive strategy through mathematical analysis [33, 34], but in our experiment positive and nega-
tive reinforcers have different units (pellets and time respectively). Due to this reason, we did a
(open circles) and the difference was statistically different (p< 0.0062) in two of three subjects, because one had no significant
difference after matrix change, p> 0.05(cooperation: 0.7063). (C) The 3D plots related cooperation, reward and timeout. In the group
of cooperative animals (filled dots), the change in T (3 pellets to 5 pellets) increased both timeout and reward in order to decrease
cooperation (open circles). The comparison between cooperation mean of both groups was significantly different, p< 0.05. (D) In the
group of non-cooperative animals (filled dots), they learned to cooperate (open circles) by receiving more reward without significant
changes in total timeout. The cooperation was significantly different, p> 0.05. (E,F) The mean of occupancy state rate graph (last five
sessions) from cooperative (left) and non-cooperative (right) groups (Mean ± sem). Asterisks denote significant difference, after matrix
changed, among T, R, P or S state occupancy and dash line indicates the level of equal rate in each state (that corresponds to a strategy
with strongly random component). Before changes (filled dots) and after changes (open circles).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204837.g002
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Fig 3. Markov chain diagrams and contrast index. Markov chain diagrams are shown (the size of circle means of occupancy state rate and the arrow’s
width are proportional to the probability of cooperate given (A) occupancy state and transition probabilities for an animal that disrupted its cooperative
behavior when contrast index CI ¼ 1
2
was changed to CI ¼ 2
3
and pay-off matrix was changed [PT, PR, PP, PS] = [3p, 1p, 4s, 8s] to [5p, 1p, 4s, 8s] (p = pellet
and s = seconds). The thickness of blue arrows (conditional probabilities of cooperation) become thinner after change (for values see Table 1). (B) The
opposite situation can be seen, non-cooperative animal becomes more cooperative when CI ¼ 1
2
was decreased to CI ¼ 1
5
in a matrix that favors cooperation.
Reciprocal altruism in rats: The role of payoff matrix
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single analysis using the Markov chain diagram. In the first experiment, we found that animals
adopted two well defined strategies. On one hand, a group of 8 animals proved to have learned
a cooperative strategy while other 4 animals responded at random (see S1B Fig, Supporting
information). The strategy of the first group, (see Fig 1E), show that conditional probabilities
to cooperation given previous state T, R, P or S were near 1 (0.760, 0.845, 0.929 and 0.870,
respectively) and in this fashion after defected they immediately return to the mutual coopera-
tion state, R. In various works, results were presented with Markov diagrams and its associated
transition vector [10, 11, 23, 32] and showed that conditional probabilities of cooperation were
not high when facing a reciprocal opponent. In this protocol, with the matrix (PT = 2, PR = 1,
PP = 4s, PS = 8s), there are two theoretical strategies that maximize appetite reinforcement: one
is ALLC strategy and the other an alternating between cooperation (C) and defection (D) strat-
egy. The latter, also maximizes positive reinforcement when alternating between cooperation
and defection options, but it also increases negative reinforcement (timeout). In this case,
ALLC strategy is the only one that maximizes positive reinforcement and minimizes the nega-
tive one (Pareto Optimum). Since negative reinforcement is timeout, ALLC strategy gives
more food per unit of time. In this case, the role of the negative reinforcement appears.
In order to evaluate if animals developed ALLC strategy by place preference (after animals
learned iPD) or by reward maximization, they were trained on reversal, (see Fig 1F), and we
observed that animals relearn reciprocal altruism when they are exposed to a new lever’s
contingency.
Finally, after animals adopted a strategy, we evaluated if a change in the payoff matrix could
modify their behavior. Therefore, we studied the effect of modifying positive reinforcements
(see Fig 2A and 2B). Animals were pre-trained with a payoff matrix where alternating between
C and D strategy gives more positive reinforcements than with an ALLC strategy, keeping the
same negative reinforcement as in the first experiment. We observed that only half of the ani-
mals learned to cooperate although all of them obtained the same mean amount reward (pel-
let) (see Fig 2C and 2D). The cooperative group was trained with a matrix where the pay-off
T was increased (Fig 2A), then we observed that cooperative behavior decreased. Animals
reduced frequency of R state and increased frequency of P state, proving that they preferred a
small-immediate option instead of a large-delayed option. This behavior is similar to the one
observed in birds ([30]). In the second group, we applied a matrix that keeps the proportions
of reinforcements in T and R similar to the most common matrix (PT = 3p, PR = 2p equal pro-
portion to PT = 6p, PR = 4). It was observed that animals modified their behavior and became
more cooperative (Fig 2B). These results show that rats that learned to cooperate with an
appropriate matrix stop cooperating when a temptation payoff (T) is sufficiently increased
(matrix with high contrast index). However, if non-cooperative animals are trained with a
matrix that favors cooperation (matrix with low contrast index), they become cooperators.
In the latter case, the achieved cooperation level was comparable to results shared in diverse
bibliography. We observe that if an iPD matrix uses large positive reward, it improves less
cooperation than one with small rewards, shown that satisfying the relationship among iPD
reinforcement was not enough to achieve high mutual cooperation behavior. The reciprocal
altruist behavior in humans, monkeys and elephants has been studied in laboratories showing
high levels of cooperation [13, 15, 35–37], however in rats and birds those levels of cooperation
were much lower. Our results show that by using positive and negative reinforcements and an
The blue arrows become thicker after change (for values see Table 1). (C, D) shows cooperation and timeout levels as a function of CI. Here, it can be seen
that both variables follow an inverted U profile in correlation with the contrast index increase and if the payoff matrix favors or not the cooperation
behavior.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204837.g003
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appropriate contrast between rewards, rats have cognitive capacity to learn reciprocal altruism.
This finding allows to deduce learning of reciprocal altruism appeared early in evolution.
Supporting information
S1 Fig. Non-cooperative rats. (A) Time-course of cooperation rate along the last 23 game ses-
sions. In the last 5 sessions, the mean ± sem of cooperation was 0.36 ± 0.03. (B) Markov Chain
diagram shows the probabilities of transition between states (p(c|T−1) = 0.44, p(c|R−1) = 0.38,
p(c|S−1) = 0.32, p(c|P−1) = 0.32). The arrow represents transitions: driven by cooperation in
blue, and driven by defection in red (the arrow thickness is proportional to transition probabil-
ity). The size of circles is proportional to the state occupancy ratio. Below, bars show the occu-
pancy ratio (T = 0.25, R = 0.19, P = 0.33, S = 0.23 and p> 0.05, F = 0.353, ANOVA two-way
test, n = 4) and transition probabilities (p(c|T−1) = 0.43, p(c|R−1) = 0.38, p(c|S−1) = 0.32,
p(c|P−1) = 0.31) did not evidence preference for any defined strategy. Asterisks denote signifi-
cant differences from multiple comparisons using one-way ANOVA and Bonferroni correc-
tion.
(EPS)
S2 Fig. Scheme of dual operand conditioning chamber. Two operant boxes are placed, one
in front of the other in such a way that transparent windows were aligned. In the front panel of
each box, there are two light stimulus (green = on / black = off) on the top, two levers in the
middle and two windows (red shadow) in down. In the subject box both lights are turned on
at the same time when the trial starts, and in the opponent box only a light is on. The opponent
was trained to choose the side where the light is on, but the subject has to learn which side
maximizes reward.
(EPS)
S3 Fig. Abbreviations list.
(EPS)
S4 Fig. Dataset of all treatments.
(PDF)
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